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I. INTRODUCTION
People come to mediation in order to solve differences in a consensual way.
They want to make their own decisions; otherwise they would go to court or to
arbitration and seek an expert decision. But mediators have a role to play. They
must make decisions in order to fulfill their role and conduct the mediation. How
should mediation parties and mediators share decision-making in mediation? To
what extent should mediation parties control decision-making? What kind of
decisions may mediators make alone? What kind of decisions may mediators
make against the wishes of the parties?
A review of the major codes of conduct for mediators and mediation
literature on decision-making reveals several approaches to the allocation of
decision-making authority in mediation. According to one approach, the parties
are responsible to and have control over the content and outcome of mediation,
1
while mediators are responsible to and have control over the process. Another
approach distinguishes between substantive decisions that should be made by
mediation parties and other non-substantive decisions that should be made by
2
mediators. A third approach simply ignores the tension between the parties’ right
3
to make decisions and the mediator’s duty to make decisions. These approaches
cannot guide mediators in making decisions during mediation and cannot inform
mediation parties of what constitutes legitimate behavior of mediators with
respect to decision-making; yet, these are precisely some of the goals of
4
mediators’ codes of conduct. The reason for that failure is that it is impossible to
draw a clear line between process and content and between substantive and nonsubstantive decisions. Decisions on process are bound to affect content and
outcome and should be considered, at least sometimes, as substantive. Ignoring
the issue altogether, without supplying guidance on how decision-making is to be
shared, simply leaves mediators and parties in a state of confusion. Thus, an
effort is made in this Article to look for another basis for allocating decisionmaking authority in mediation.

1. See infra Part II.A & Part III.
2. See infra Part II.B & Part III.
3. See infra Part II.C.
4. See, e.g., MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS pmbl. (2005), available at
http://www.abanet.org/dispute/documents/model_standards_conduct_april2007.pdf (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review) [hereinafter Model Standards]. See also Rules of Conduct for Mediators in Court-Connected
Mediation Programs for Civil Cases, CAL. RULES OF COURT, R. 3.850(a) (2010), available at
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/rules/documents/pdfFiles/title_3.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
[hereinafter California Rules of Conduct]; FLA. RULES FOR CERTIFIED AND COURT-APPOINTED MEDIATORS R.
10.200 (2010), available at http://www.flcourts.org/gen_public/adr/bin/RulesForMediators.pdf (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) [Florida Rules for Mediators]; Oregon Mediation Association Core Standards of
Mediation Practice, pmbl. (Revised Apr. 23, 2005), available at http://www.omediate.org/docs/2005Core
StandardsFinalP.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) [OMA Standards of Practice].
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This Article suggests a theory for decision-making in mediation, which is
based on a general right of parties to make all decisions in mediation, and a
general duty of mediators to conduct mediation in accordance with the rules of
5
conduct that apply to them. The Article argues that the parties’ right is limited in
two senses. Firstly, their right does not extend to decisions that they practically or
6
ethically cannot make. Secondly, the right of the parties is perceived as a relative
7
right, which might be restricted by mediators for justified reasons. In order to
justify an intervention with parties’ right to make decisions, mediators must be
able to show that the intervention is minimal and necessary in order to conduct
8
the mediation according to the applicable rules of conduct. Thus, the theory
seeks both to delineate the decision-making powers of mediators and parties, and
to offer a rationale for the legitimate restrictions mediators may impose on
mediation parties’ right to make decisions. The theory is not restricted to a
9
specific mediation style and assumes that mediators of all styles must respect
party self-determination, must make decisions themselves, and need guidelines
10
on appropriate interventions in party decision-making.
This Article differs from current literature on decision-making in mediation
11
12
in that previous scholarship has focused on decision-making by mediators or

5. See infra Part IV.
6. See infra Part IV.B.1.
7. See infra Part IV.B.
8. See infra Part IV.B.2.
9. See generally Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators’ Orientations, Strategies, and
Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7 (1996); LAURENCE BOULLE & MIRYANA
NESIC, MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES PROCESS PRACTICE 27–29 (2001); Michal Alberstein, Forms of Mediation and
Law: Cultures of Dispute Resolution, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 321, 328–42 (2007).
10. For a similar argument concerning the implications of a theory of informed consent on the practice
of mediators, see Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent in Mediation: A Guiding Principle for Truly
Educated Decisionmaking, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 775, 814 (1999) (“The principle of informed consent does
not depend for its vitality on any particular practice model but must be operationalized in all decisionmaking
models”).
11. For a discussion of decision-making in mediation, see infra Part III. Decision-making in a
professional setting has been subject to academic investigation. For writing on decision-making in lawyer-client
relationships see, e.g., DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO’S IN CHARGE? (1974); Mark
Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L.
REV. 41 (1979); Marcy Strauss, Toward a Revised Model of Attorney-Client Relationship: The Argument for
Autonomy, 65 N.C. L. REV. 315 (1987); Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and
Refinement, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 501 (1990); Robert F. Cochran, Legal Representation and the Next Steps Toward
Client Control: Attorney Malpractice for the Failure to Allow the Client to Control Negotiation and Pursue
Alternatives to Litigation, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 819 (1990); DANIEL MARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL
ETHICS 28-31(2008). For writing on decision-making in doctor-patient relationship see e.g., Linda L. Emanuel
& Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Four Models of the Physician-Patient Relationship, 267 JAMA 2221 (1992); Roger B.
Dworkin, Getting What We Should from Doctors: Rethinking Patient Autonomy and the Doctor-Patient
Relationship, 13 HEALTH MATRIX 235 (2003); Marjorie Maguire Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient
Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219 (1985).
12. A prominent example is Riskin, supra note 9. See also Nolan-Haley, supra note 10, at n. 188
(referring to literature on mediation models and styles which focus on mediators’ behavior).
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13

by the parties while this Article combines both and focuses on the intersection
between the exercise of decision-making powers by mediators and parties and on
14
the resulting tension of that meeting, The Article does not discuss the
definitional elements of party self-determination (i.e., that decisions must be
15
voluntary, un-coerced, free, and informed).
Parts II and III of the Article describe the current approaches to allocation of
decision-making powers in mediation, as reflected in leading codes of conduct
for mediators and in mediation literature. Part IV suggests a new basis for sharing
decision-making authority in mediation that avoids the shortcomings of the
current approaches. Part V illustrates how the theory applies to all the decisions
that are made in mediation. Part VI summarizes the insights of the Article.
II. THE VAGUENESS OF CODES OF CONDUCT ON DECISION-MAKING IN
MEDIATION
There are numerous codes of conduct for mediators and it is impossible to
16
review them all. Thus, the Article selects and focuses on three major codes of
conduct for mediators: the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators (Model
17
Standards), California Rules of Conduct for Mediators in Court-Connected
18
Mediation Programs for Civil Cases (California Rules of Conduct), and Florida
Rules for Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators (Florida Rules for
19
Mediators). These leading codes of conduct are highly regarded and provide
20
important guidance for ethical conduct in mediation.

13. See e.g., Nolan-Haley, supra note 10, at n. 188 (“I focus on the parties to the dispute and on their
exercise of autonomy in decisionmaking rather than on activity by the mediator”); id. at 814.
14. Leonard L. Riskin, Decisionmaking in Mediation: The New Old Grid and the New New Grid System,
79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 21–28 (2003).
15. See Model Standards, supra note 4, at Standard I.A. For writing focusing on the meaning of party
self-determination see, e.g., Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-Connected
Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization? 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1 (2001).
16. See Policy & Standards, ABA (last visited May 12, 2013), http://www.americanbar.org/groups/
dispute_resolution/policy_standards.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (listing various mediation
codes of conduct).
17. Model Standards, supra note .
18. California Rules of Conduct, supra note 4.
19. Florida Rules for Mediators, supra note 4.
20. The Model Standards represent a joint and continued effort of many years by several leading
organizations of developing guidelines for mediators’ conduct. See Model Standards Reporter’s Notes, 1–6
(Jan. 17, 2005), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/programs/adr/msoc/pdf/reportersnotes-jan17final.pdf (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review); Julie Macfarlane, Mediating Ethically: The Limits of Codes of Conduct
and the Potential of a Reflective Practice Model, 40 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 49, 53 (2002) (describing the Model
Standards as a prominent example of codes of conduct for mediators); Paula M. Young, Rejoice! Rejoice!
Rejoice, Give Thanks, and Sing: ABA, ACR, and AAA Adopt Revised Model Standards of Conduct for
Mediators, 5 APPAL. J. L. 195, 197–00 (2006); Laura E. Weidner, Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators,
21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 539, 549–53 (2006). In addition, the Model Standards have inspired other codes
of conduct and influenced their content. See, e.g., MEDIATORS REVISED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF
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A. The Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators: Adopting a Process/Content
Approach to Decision-Making?
The Model Standards anchor the authority of mediation parties to make
decisions in a Self-Determination Standard; that authority is drafted widely and
applies to decisions on “process and outcome” “at any stage of a mediation,”
“including mediator selection, process design, participation in or withdrawal
21
from the process, and outcomes.” However, the Standards remain vague on the
allocation of decision-making authority between the mediator and the parties.
This is because alongside the Self-Determination Standard, which states that the
22
parties have authority to make decisions in mediation, stands a Quality of the
Process Standard, which authorizes the mediator to make decisions necessary in
order to “conduct a mediation in accordance with [the] Standards and in a
manner that promotes diligence, timeliness, safety, presence of the appropriate
participants, party participation, procedural fairness, party competency and
23
mutual respect among all participants.”
The possible conflict between the Self-Determination Standard and the
Quality of the Process Standard is not dealt with adequately in the Standards and
several issues remain unresolved. For example, the Self-Determination Standard
recognizes that there may be circumstances in which the mediator would be
authorized to balance party self-determination with his “duty to conduct a quality
THE COLORADO COUNCIL OF MEDIATORS AND MEDIATION ORGANIZATIONS Introductory Note (last visited
May 12, 2013), available at http://www.dola.state.co.us/osg/docs/adrmediatorscode.pdf [hereinafter Colorado
Code of Conduct] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); LAW COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIA, ETHICAL
GUIDELINES FOR MEDIATORS (2006), available at http://www.nswbar.asn.au/docs/professional/ adr/documents/
LawCouncilEthicalGuidelinesforMediators.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); A GUIDE FOR
FEDERAL EMPLOYEE MEDIATORS, available at http://www.justice.gov/adr/pdf/final_manual.pdf, Forward, The
Nebraska Standards of Practice and Ethics for Family Mediators, available at http://www.
supremecourt.ne.gov/mediation/pdf/Standards_and_Ethics_Revised_10-31-08.pdf. See also Young, id. at 197
(stating that “Virginia has a Standards of Ethics that its drafters modeled on the 1994 Model Standards”);
Weidner, id. at 551 (noting that “The Model Standards (1994), as a whole, met great success. Many states
adopted it in whole or at least used the 1994 version as a template to form their own ethical codes for
mediators”). See also Susan Nauss Exon, How can a Mediator Be Both Impartial and Fair?: Why Ethical
Standards of Conduct Create Chaos for Mediators, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 387, 408 (2006) (noting the
importance of the California and Florida codes).
21. Model Standards, supra note 4, Standard I.A.
22. Alongside the general authority to make decisions contained in the Self-Determination Standard,
other standards refer to circumstances in which parties have an authority to make specific decisions. For
example, the decision whether a mediator who has disclosed a conflict of interests may continue to mediate the
dispute or the decision to select any mediator whose competency and qualifications satisfy the parties’
expectations. Id. Standard III.C, D, Standard IV.A.1.
23. Id. Standard VI.A. The Quality of Process standard goes on to determine mediators’ authority to
make specific decisions in several areas. Mediators may decide, together with the parties, on the presence or
absence of persons at the mediation, and recommend other dispute resolution processes. Id. at Standard VI.A.3,
7. Other standards refer to additional cases of mediator decision-making. Mediators have authority to make
decisions to assist the parties to exercise self-determination, such as decisions to refer parties to consult other
professionals. Id. at Standard I.A. “Mediators may accept . . . de minimis gifts” in certain circumstances.” Id.
Standard II.B.3.
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process,” but this is limited by the words of the standard to decisions on process
24
design. It seems therefore that according to the Standards mediators cannot
balance parties’ decisions that are not on process design, such as decisions on
mediator selection, participation in or withdrawal from the process, and
outcomes. But other standards of the Model Standards expressly impose
limitations on party self-determination of issues other than process design, such
25
as the power of parties to select a mediator! Moreover, at least one code of
conduct for mediators clearly rejects the distinction between process design and
26
other decisions and attaches the balancing authority to all types of decisions. So
it seems that the Standards adopt, de-facto, a process/content distinction
according to which process design is treated as a matter of procedure in which
the mediator is entitled to intervene; while other decisions are treated as relating
to content and are thus made subject to the parties’ decision making. But what
27
are decisions on process design? Do they not affect content?
In addition to express limitations that the Model Standards impose on the
parties’ right to make decisions on process design and on mediator selection, the
Standards limit the parties’ freedom of choice on other issues without expressly
28
stating so. The mediator’s authority to make decisions is also subject to
29
numerous restrictions. These observations demonstrate the confusing message
sent by the Standards with regard to decision-making in mediation and point to
the need for identifying a clear rationale for the allocation of decision-making
authority between mediators and parties and clear guidelines for legitimate
mediator interventions in party decision-making.

24. Id. Standard I.A.1.
25. See e.g., Model Standards, supra note 4, Standard III.E. The conflicts of interest standard provides
that parties cannot select a mediator “if a mediator’s conflict of interest might reasonably be viewed as
undermining the integrity of the mediation”, thus imposing a limitation on mediator selection. Id. ; see also
infra Part V.B.
26. See STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR NEW YORK STATE COMMUNITY DISPUTE RESOLUTION CENTER
MEDIATORS Standard I, cmt. 2 (revised October 16, 2009), available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/adr/
Publications/Info_for_Programs/Standards_of_Conduct.pdf [hereinafter NY-CDRC Standards of Conduct] (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review).
27. See infra notes 65–66 and accompanying text; infra Part V.A.
28. For example, a mediator may be required by law to disclose mediation information even where the
parties object to such disclosure. Model Standards, supra note 4, Standard V.A. Mediators must not establish a
relationship with one of the parties subsequent to the mediation in a “matter that would raise questions about the
integrity of the mediation” even where the parties agree to such relationship. Id. Standard III.F.S.
29. Mediators must decline a mediation in certain circumstances for reasons of impartiality, id. at
Standard II.A, or conflict of interests, id. at Standard III.A,E; mediators must discontinue mediation where their
conduct jeopardizes conducting the mediation consistent with the Standards, id. at Standard VI.C ; mediators
are not allowed to accept gifts and favors which raise a question of impartiality. Id. at Standard II.B.2, 3.
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B. Florida Rules for Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators: Adopting a
Substantive/Non-Substantive Approach to Decision-Making
The Florida Rules for Mediators do not use the process/content distinction
and instead replace it with a substantive/non-substantive terminology, stating that
30
a “mediator shall not make substantive decisions for any party.” The Rule’s
language regarding the parties’ right to make decisions is not free of doubt. On
31
the one hand, the self-determination rule, along with other rules, grant
mediation parties a right of self-determination that could be construed as relating
32
33
to all mediation decisions in all stages of the process. On the other hand, the
self-determination rule provides that mediators shall not make substantive
34
decisions for the parties, which may be construed as allowing the mediator to
make non-substantive decisions. The difficulty is that the Rules do not define
what substantive decisions are, thus leaving unanswered the question: what are
non-substantive decisions that mediators may make for the parties? Defining
35
procedural decisions as non-substantive would allow mediators to make
decisions on procedural matters as opposed to substantive matters. But the terms
“substantive decisions” and “non-substantive decisions” do not clarify the
allocation of decision-making authority between mediators and mediation parties
more than the process/content distinction. For example, is setting the mediation
agenda procedural or substantive? In my opinion, it is a substantive decision that
36
should be made by mediation parties, but others might consider it a process
decision.
The Florida Rules for Mediators do not clearly define mediators’ authority to
make decisions. This authority is implied from a number of rules which make it
possible for mediators to carry out their duties, such as the rule stating the role of
30. Florida Rules for Mediators, supra note 4, R. 10.310(a); see also ALABAMA CODE OF ETHICS FOR
MEDIATORS Standard 4(a) (1997), available at http://www.alabamaadr.org /index.php?option=com_content
&task=view&id=24&Itemid=6 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
31. Florida Rules for Mediators, supra note 4, R. 10.310(a).
32. See, e.g., id. (“Decisions made during a mediation are to be made by the parties”); id. R. 10.310(b)
(“A mediator shall not coerce or improperly influence any party to make a decision . . . .”) (emphasis added); id.
R. 10.220 (“The ultimate decision-making authority, however, rests solely with the parties.”); id. R.
10.420(a)(2) (“The mediator is an impartial facilitator without authority to impose a resolution or adjudicate any
aspect of the dispute . . . .”) (emphasis added); id. R. 10.310, Committee Notes to Florida Rules for Mediators,
(“A mediator must not substitute the judgment of the mediator for the judgment of the parties, coerce or compel
a party to make a decision . . . .”) (emphasis added).
33. See id. R. 10.310, Committee Notes to Florida Rules for Mediators (“It is critical that the parties’
right to self-determination (a free and informed choice to agree or not to agree) is preserved during all phases of
mediation.”).
34. Id. R. 10.310(a).
35. See, e.g., Substantive Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/Substantively
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“[E]ssential legal principles administered by the courts, as opposed to
practice and procedure.”).
36. See Omer Shapira, Joining Forces in Search for Answers: The Use of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in
the Realm of Mediation Ethics, 8 PEPPERDINE DISP. RESOL. J. 243, 256–58 (2008).

929

_04_FIX..SHAPIRA_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1/31/2014 9:40 AM

2013 / A Theory of Sharing Decision-Making in Mediation
37

the mediator, the rule determining mediators’ responsibility to mediation
38
39
parties, and the rule instructing mediators to conduct a balanced process,
Despite the fact that the Rules recognize limitations on mediation parties’ right of
40
self-determination and on the freedom of mediators to make decisions in
41
specific circumstances, the Rules lack a general statement guiding mediators
actions in the event of a clash between the wishes of mediation parties and the
duty of mediators to conduct the mediation ethically according to the Rules.
C. California Rules of Conduct for Mediators in Court-Connected Mediation
Programs for Civil Cases: Ignoring the Problem of Decision-Making
Allocation
The California Rules of Conduct do not use either the process/content or the
substantive/non-substantive distinction to describe decision-making in
42
mediation. The Rules include a “voluntary participation and self-determination”
43
standard and make clear that mediation parties have the authority to make
44
decisions on the outcome of mediation, on whether to continue to participate in
45
the mediation, on the extent of their participation in the process, and on
46
withdrawal.

37. Florida Rules for Mediators, supra note 4, R. 10.220.
38. Id. R. 10.300.
39. Id. R. 10.410.
40. See, e.g., id. at R. 10.340(c) (withdrawal due to a conflict of interest that clearly impairs a mediator’s
impartiality); id. R. 10.420(b) (listing circumstances in which the mediator must adjourn or terminate the
mediation).
41. Mediators’ authority to make decisions is restricted by provisions that assign decision-making
authority to the parties. See supra note 32. In some circumstances the authority of mediators to decide on the
continuation of the mediation is restricted and they have to withdraw from or terminate the mediation, for
example, where “a party is unable to freely exercise self-determination,” id. at R. 10.310(d), or where a
mediator is no longer impartial, id. at R. 10.330(b).
42. For other codes which do not employ the process/content/substantive terminology in defining the
principle of party self-determination see, e.g., THE MEDIATION COUNCIL OF ILLINOIS PROFESSIONAL
STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR MEDIATORS (2009), available at http://www.mediationcouncilofillinois.org/
MCI%20Professional%20 Standards%20of%20Practice%20Revised%202.4.10.pdf (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review) [hereinafter MCI Standard of Practice] (“The mediation process relies upon the ability of
participants to make their own voluntary and informed decisions”); STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
FOR MEDIATORS ADOPTED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA Standard V.A. (2010), available at
http://www.nccourts.org/Courts/CRS/Councils/DRC/Documents/Standards_030110.pdf
[hereinafter
NC
Standards of Conduct] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“A mediator … shall not impose his/her
judgment or opinions for those of the parties concerning any aspect of the mediation.”) (emphasis added); OMA
Standards of Practice, supra note 4, at Standard I, cmt. 1 (“Participants should be free to choose their own
dispute resolution process, and mediators should encourage them to make their own decisions on all issues.”).
43. California Rules of Conduct, supra note 4, R. 3.853.
44. Id. R. 3.853(1).
45. Id. R. 3.853(3).
46. Id. R. 3.853(2).
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The Rules are unclear whether parties’ decision-making authority extends to
all mediation decisions, but arguably this is the result of two of the Rules: one
47
instructs mediators to “refrain from coercing any party to make a decision” (i.e.,
the rule does not specify certain types of decisions and therefore refers to all
decisions). The other instructs mediators to “conduct the mediation proceedings
in a procedurally fair manner” while defining “procedural fairness” as “a
balanced process in which each party is given an opportunity to participate and
48
make un-coerced decisions” (i.e., again, the rule refers to decisions of any type
which may not be coerced).
The California Rules of Conduct neither include a specific rule stating that
mediators have a general authority to make decisions, nor a rule discussing
generally the potential conflict between mediation parties’ wishes and mediators’
duty to make decisions which might be inconsistent with the parties’ desires.
Instead, one finds rules imposing duties on mediators and authorizing them
49
thereby to make decisions and take actions necessary to fulfill those duties. In
addition, the Rules supply many illustrations of limitations on mediation parties’
50
right of self-determination and on the authority of mediators to make
51
decisions. As in the case of the Model Standards and the Florida Rules for
Mediators, a clear statement on the allocation of decision-making authority
between parties and mediators and an explicit rationale for it are missing; as a
result, the guidance of the Rules is undermined.
III. NO ANSWER IN MEDIATION LITERATURE: THE UNSATISFACTORY STATE OF
CURRENT LITERATURE ON DECISION-MAKING IN MEDIATION
If codes of conduct for mediators fail to adequately address the issue of
decision-making in mediation, can answers be found in mediation literature?
Writers have recognized the process/content approach and distinguished between
procedural decisions and decisions on content or outcome; these authors assign
mediators with responsibility for making procedural decisions and parties with
52
responsibility for making decisions on the content of mediation and its outcome.

47. Id. R. 3.853(3) (emphasis added).
48. Id. R. 3.857(b) (emphasis added).
49. For example, R. 3.853 instructs the mediator to “conduct the mediation in a manner that supports the
principles of voluntary participation and self-determination by the parties”. Id. R. 3.853. R. 3.857(b) requires
that mediators “conduct the mediation proceedings in a procedurally fair manner . . . [where] each party is given
an opportunity to participate and make uncoerced decisions.” Id. R. 3.857(b).
50. Parties cannot excuse mediator impartiality or incompetence and mediators must decline a mediation
or withdraw from mediation notwithstanding the parties’ wishes to the contrary “where the mediator cannot
maintain impartiality toward all the participants.” Id. R. 3.855(f)(1).
51. Mediators are not allowed to coerce “any party to make a decision or to continue to participate in the
mediation,” id. R. at 3.853(3), and must provide the parties with information on various matters such as the
voluntary nature of the agreement. Id. at R. 3.853(1).
52. See, e.g., Riskin, supra note 9, at 43 n. 145; Boulle & Nesic, supra note 9, at 19.
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Other writers have preferred the substantive/non-substantive terminology, and
distinguished between substantive decisions and making non-substantive
53
decisions. According to this distinction, mediation parties are presumed to be in
charge of making substantive decisions and mediators are presumed to be in
54
charge of making non-substantive decisions. The substantive/non-substantive
distinction is linked to the process/content distinction if substantive decisions are
viewed as decisions on content and outcome, and non-substantive decisions as
decisions on procedure. A third distinction that has been made in mediation
literature, which is also linked to the process/content approach, distinguishes
between an interventionist or directive mediator style, which allows for an
extensive decision-making capacity for the mediator, and a non-interventionist or
non-directive style, which assigns the mediator a more modest decision-making
55
role.
56
Writers seem to accept these distinctions and rely upon them. Kovach, for
example, has accepted the process/content distinction and argued that mediators
control and have responsibility for the process while mediation parties control
57
and have responsibility for the content of mediation. Other writers have
suggested that mediation parties are entitled to control both process and
58
outcome. Some writers discuss decision making in mediation in ways that
illustrate the shortcomings of such generalizations and show, for example, the
59
limitations of the process/content distinction as a guide for decision-making.
However, no writer has yet offered a different concept of decision-making in
mediation, which can provide clear and detailed guidelines to mediators on how
decision-making in mediation is to be shared. Take Riskin for example, who
described in a well-known article different mediator styles involving various
degrees of intervention, but did not take a stand on the appropriate practice that

53. See e.g., John Lande & Gregg Herman, Fitting the Forum to the Family Fuss: Choosing Mediation,
Collaborative Law, or Cooperative Law for Negotiating Divorce Cases, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 280, 282 (2004);
Nancy Ver Steegh, Yes, No, and Maybe: Informed Decision Making About Divorce Mediation in the Presence
of Domestic Violence, 9 WM. & MARY J. OF WOMEN & L. 145, 173–74 (2003).
54. Id.
55. See e.g., Boulle & Nesic, supra note 9, at 21; CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS:
PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT 55 (3rd ed., 2003).
56. Infra notes 57–63 and accompanying text.
57. See KIMBERLEE K. KOVACH, MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 46 (3d ed., 2004).
58. See CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW, ET AL., MEDIATION: PRACTICE, POLICY, AND ETHICS 94 (2006).
59. See, e.g. Boulle & Nesic, supra note 9, at 14, 19–21 (considering the description of mediators as
having control over the process and refraining from interfering with the content of the dispute as an unresolved
issue); id. at 20 (describing situations in which mediators and parties share control of the process and arguing
that “[m]ediators do not, in all respects, control the process alone”); see also Moore, supra note 55, at 217
(“The mediator should clearly explain the stages of the problem solving process and should take care not to
present herself as an authority figure. It is the disputants’ process, not the mediator’s. The process description is
a procedural suggestion, not an order.”); id. at 226 (“The choice [of opening] to focus on substance, process, or
the psychological conditions of the disputants depends on: . . . The degree of authority the disputants have given
to the mediator to design and regulate the process of the meeting and opening procedures or statements.”).
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60

mediators should adopt. In a later article, Riskin distinguished between
61
substantive, procedural, and meta-procedural decisions made in mediation, but
again refrained from opining on the appropriate allocation of decision-making
62
authority between the mediator and the parties. Another writer focused on
decision-making in mediation is Nolan-Haley, who described four models of
63
mediator-parties relationships or mediation autonomy. However, these models
do not reveal a clear allocation of decision-making authority between mediators
and mediation parties, and the author refrains from evaluating the models or
64
choosing between them.
This short review of the literature suggests that mediation literature, like
mediators’ codes of conduct, is unable, at its current state, to supply adequate
guidance to mediators and to parties on their decision-making rights. The use of
process/content and substantive/non-substantive terminology is vague and
unhelpful because it is difficult to distinguish between decisions on process or
procedure and decisions on content or substance. There is extensive literature
arguing that decisions that are often classified as procedural can potentially
influence the content and outcome of mediation and the ability of the parties to
exercise self-determination in relation to substantive issues in mediation,
65
including the mediated agreement. As a result, an attempt to assign decisionmaking authority along the lines of process/content or substantive/non66
substantive decisions is bound to fail.
Moreover, the discussion in the literature of an interventionist-directive style
and a non-interventionist-non-directive style does not inform us on the allocation
of decision-making authority in mediation, but rather assumes and presupposes
such allocation. The degree of mediators’ directiveness is worth considering both

60. See Riskin, supra note 9, at 12–13.
61. See Riskin, supra note 9, at 34–37.
62. See id at 49 (“In this Article, I do not mean to promote a particular approach to decisionmaking in
general or in a given mediation.”).
63. See Nolan-Haley, supra note 1, at 815–16 (describing paternalistic, instrumentalist, informative, and
deliberative models of mediator-party relationships).
64. Id. at 814. “My purpose [with the exception of Part V of Nolan-Haley’s article where she “suggest[s]
using an informative decisionmaking model for unrepresented parties in mandatory court mediation,”. . . is
neither to evaluate nor to recommend, but to explain how parties exercise autonomy and self-determination in
mediation in order to elaborate a theory of informed consent that accommodates the realities of practice.” Id. at
n. 91.
65. See Riskin, supra note 9, at 28; Boulle & Nesic, supra note 9, at 20, 26; Macfarlane, supra note 20,
at 59; Forrest S. Mosten Collaborative Law Practice: An Unbundled Approach to Informed Client Decision
Making, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 163, n. 4 (2008).
66. See infra Part V.A. In legal ethics the distinction between ends (controlled by the client) and means
(controlled by the lawyer) has been subject to similar criticism. See, e.g, Strauss, supra note 11, at 324–25;
David Luban, Paternalism and the Legal Profession, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 454, n. 9 (1981); Rodney J. Uphoff,
Who Should Control The Decision to Call a Witness: Respecting a Criminal Defendant’s Tactical Choices, 68
U. CIN. L. REV. 763, 775–78 (2000).
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67

in relation to procedural matters and substantive matters. However, one cannot
deduce from a mediator’s style whether and in what circumstances decisionmaking authority rests with the parties, or rather, with the mediator—unless the
supposition is that a high degree of directiveness should be limited to some types
of decisions, for example to decisions on process. Yet, this brings back the
unresolved problem of the need to distinguish between process and content.
Thus, the distinction between degrees of intervention and directiveness has
importance not as a means for identifying the allocation of decision-making
authority between the mediator and the parties, but for assessing the legitimacy
of mediator actions (i.e., for considering whether the degree of intervention or
direction has been so high as to undermine the parties’ right to make a decision).
Such discussion, in order to be meaningful, must rest on a prior understanding of
the extent of mediation parties’ and mediators’ authority to make decisions.
The argued conclusion is that an attempt to differentiate between process and
content for the purpose of assigning decision-making authority is futile.
Similarly, there is no point in searching for a dividing line between substantive
and non-substantive decisions. A new workable approach is needed; an approach
that clearly delineates the decision-making authority of mediators and parties,
and which offers a rationale for the legitimate restrictions mediators may impose
on mediation parties’ right to make decisions.
IV. A NEW APPROACH TO SHARING DECISION-MAKING IN MEDIATION
AND ITS DEFENSE
A. Arguments in Favor of the New Approach
A workable concept of decision-making allocation in mediation must start
with an extensive right of self-determination for the parties, which has general
application to all mediation decisions. Taking this approach avoids the traps of
the process/content and substantive/non-substantive distinctions and is consistent
with mediation philosophy and ideology, which seek to place the parties at the
heart of the process and make them the owners of it.
The Model Standards reflect this approach to a certain degree. The standard
of self-determination refers to all the stages of mediation—both to process and
outcome—and therefore can be understood as applying to all mediation
68
decisions. However, the Standards depart from this approach when they impose
on the mediator a duty to balance self-determination when making decisions on

67. See e.g., Riskin, supra note 1, at 30 (“. . . almost any conduct by the mediator directs the mediation
process, or the participants, toward a particular procedure or perspective or outcome”).
68. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. The standard’s wording, which refers to different types of
decisions other than the decision on outcome, is not incidental and was intended to extend the scope of selfdetermination. See Model Standards Reporter’s notes, supra note 20, at 9.
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process design, thus bringing back the process/content distinction through the
back door. As noted above, the Florida Rules for Mediators and the California
Rules of Conduct also support an extensive self-determination right to mediation
parties, but the California Rules of Conduct use the substantive/non-substantive
distinction and the California Rules of Conduct do not address the possible clash
69
between mediators’ and parties’ decision-making.
Self-determination is a right in the sense that it enables a party to make
70
decisions, insist on his choices, and oppose the will of others. The right of selfdetermination belongs to each party separately; thus, the right may be exercised
with respect to all decisions, not only against mediators, but also against other
mediation parties. For example, neither the mediator, nor any party, may deny a
party’s right to decide who shall be the mediator in his case, whether to
participate in mediation or to withdraw from it, whether to accept or reject a
particular resolution, or whether to agree to disclosure of information obtained in
private session. Decisions of all types should not be coerced and must be made
with each party’s consent.
While it is true that mediation parties have a right to make decisions
throughout the mediation process, a realistic view of mediation must recognize a
place for mediator decision-making in order for the process to achieve its goals
and promises. No one can seriously envision a mediation in which the parties
make all decisions and the mediator makes none. Mediators must make decisions
because they have a role to fulfill. Their role is to assist the parties in
communicating effectively, to negotiate constructively, and to reach an
agreement if one is desired. They have responsibilities to the parties and to the
process; with these responsibilities come duties to act. The questions are
therefore what are the decisions that mediators are allowed to make? What are
the sources of mediators’ decision-making authority? And what are the limits on
that authority in view of the parties’ extensive right of self-determination?
Let us consider the issue of the source of authority first. The Model
Standards locate, as we have seen, the major source of mediator decision-making
authority in the Quality of the Process Standard, but in fact other standards also
authorize the mediator to make those decisions that are required in order to
71
comply with the Standards. Furthermore, the Self-Determination Standard is a
69. See supra Part II.A, B.
70. It is a right stricto sensu in that it imposes a duty on the mediator to conduct the mediation on the
basis of the principle of party self-determination, see Model Standards, supra note 4, at Standard I.A., in a
manner that supports party self-determination, see California Rules of Conduct, supra note 4, R. 3.853, and to
assist the parties in making decisions and protect their right to self-determination, see Florida Rules for
Mediators, supra note 4, R. 10.310(a)). It is a privilege or a liberty in the sense that the parties are free to make
decisions or refrain from making them at any stage of mediation, id, without coercion. Florida Rules for
Mediators, id. R. 10.310(b); California Rules of Conduct, supra note 4, R. 3.853(3). On the meaning of rights
see WESLEY N. HOHFELD FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING (1919);
M.D.A. FREEMAN, LLOYD’S INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 396–97 (8th ed., 2008).
71. See supra Part II.A. Of course, the primary source for mediators’ decision-making authority is the
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source of authority not only for the parties, but also for mediators. It authorizes
mediators to make decisions that are necessary in order to “conduct a mediation
72
based on the principle of party self-determination.” The Florida Rules for
Mediators and the California Rules of Conduct do not include a specific rule that
establishes a general source of authority for mediators to make decisions, but
instead contain many other rules that impose duties on mediators, authorizing
73
them to make decisions and take actions necessary to fulfill those duties.
Whether or not codes supply a formal basis of authority for mediators to make
decisions, such authority must exist in order for them to fulfill their role. Thus,
notwithstanding the absence of a standard entitled “Mediator Decision-Making
Authority” or language of similar meaning, it should be recognized that the
authority of mediators to make decisions has an independent status, just like the
parties’ decision-making authority that is reflected in their right of selfdetermination. Thus, both mediators and parties have decision-making power.
The question is how can the mediator’s duty to make decisions and the parties’
right to make decisions be reconciled?
The answer lies in the relativity of mediation values. No standard or rule has
in-advance priority over all other standards or rules. For example, it cannot be
maintained that party self-determination is more important than mediator
impartiality, or that mediator impartiality is more important than confidentiality
74
and so forth. The weight of each norm must be ascertained in context, and no
norm always trumps the others. It follows that mediators are under a duty to
adhere to all standards or rules, and in the absence of an overriding formal
provision in a code or other appropriate justification, mediators are under a duty
to honor the parties’ right to self-determination when conducting the mediation.
Similarly, mediators must comply with their other obligations, such as acting
impartially and keeping confidences. This means, first, that as a general rule,
decisions throughout the mediation should be made by the parties; second, that
mediators, irrespective of the process/content or substantive/non-substantive
distinctions, should refrain from making decisions alone unless a special reason
justifies their intervention; and third, that when decisions are made by mediators,
parties should be able to participate in the decision-making (i.e., mediators
should discuss the issue to be decided with the parties and ascertain their
position) unless there is a compelling reason that justifies making the decision
75
without the parties.
parties’ decision to select them as mediators in their case.
72. Model Standards, supra note 4, Standard I.A.
73. See supra Part II.B & C.
74. See Model Standards, supra note 4, Note on Construction (“These Standards are to be read and
construed in their entirety. There is no priority significance attached to the sequence in which the Standards
appear.”); Model Standards Reporter’s notes, supra note 20, at 7.
75. For provisions drafted in a manner that connotes a collaborative approach to decision-making see,
e.g., CALIFORNIA DISPUTE RESOLUTION COUNCIL STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR CALIFORNIA MEDIATORS,
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Three other reasons support this approach. Firstly, in the process of
defending derogation from a right (e.g., the right of self-determination), one
should prefer the alternative that is the least harmful for the right-holder.
Allowing mediators to have exclusive decision-making power is more damaging
to the parties’ right to self-determination than exclusive party decision-making or
shared decision-making, which secures the parties a place in the decisionmaking. It follows that the presumption (which may be rebutted in certain
76
circumstances) should be that party decision-making and shared decisionmaking are preferable to mediator exclusive decision-making. Secondly, the
essence of mediation, and its most distinctive feature in comparison with
adjudication and arbitration, is party decision-making. The essence of the
mediator’s role is to help parties make decisions, not making decisions for the
parties. Whenever possible this characteristic of both process and role should be
preserved for reasons of integrity. Decision-making by mediators has the
potential of undermining the uniqueness and identity of mediation and thus
should be done sparingly and for adequate reasons. And thirdly, mediation seeks
to offer parties tools for effective communication and negotiation, which can
serve them well not only in the mediation room but also elsewhere and in future
77
disagreements. When mediators leave decision-making to the parties and share
decision-making with them whenever possible, they contribute to further that
desirable goal and assist in sending an educational message to the parties on the
ways to engage in a constructive dialogue.
What needs to be done now is to articulate the special, compelling reasons
for mediator decision-making and to explore the exceptional circumstances in
which—notwithstanding the parties’ right to self-determination—mediators may
make a decision alone without participation of the parties or even against their
will.

CDRC, Standard I (2010), available at http://ocmediationconference.org/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/
cdrcmodelrulesformediators.pdf [California (CDRC) Standards of practice] (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (“While the responsibility for conducting the mediation process rests with the Mediator in consultation
with the parties, responsibility for the resolution of a dispute rests with the parties.”) (emphasis added);
VIRGINIA STANDARDS OF ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CERTIFIED MEDIATORS, Standard
D.2.c (2011), available at http://www.courts.state.va.us/courtadmin/aoc/djs/programs/drs/mediation/soe.pdf
[hereinafter Virginia Standards of Ethics] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“The mediator shall reach
an understanding with the participants regarding the procedures which may be used in mediation”) (emphasis
added)
76. See infra Part IV.B.1.
77. See e.g., Boulle & Nesic, supra note 9, at 37 (“The [mediation] process also becomes educative for
the participants in that they are involved in and learn a problem-solving process which can be applied in other
contexts”).
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B. The Theory
The theory suggested here replaces the old, unhelpful guidelines for sharing
decision-making in mediation. It is submitted that there are two exceptions to the
general rule that decision-making authority belongs to the parties. The first
exception is when mediators are unable to share decision-making with the parties
because it is either practically impossible due to the nature of the decision or
because the mediator is prevented from doing so by the code of conduct that
governs his behavior. The second exception is when mediators have to make a
decision, despite the parties’ objection, in order to conduct the mediation in
accordance with the governing code of conduct.
1. Decisions Mediation Parties Cannot Make (Decisions Mediators Cannot
Share with the Parties)
There are numerous decisions made by mediators in the course of mediation
that codes of conduct hardly mention or briefly discuss. What questions to ask
the parties? Should certain questions be avoided? What is the right timing to ask
a question? Should the mediator summarize or reframe? Should he advise the
parties to consult an expert? Should he advise the parties to consider resolution of
their dispute through other dispute resolution processes? Should he invite the
78
parties to consider the consequences of failure to bring the dispute to an end?
79
These are decisions that mediators make by themselves, though the applicable
80
rules of conduct might impose limitations on their discretion. It is impossible to
subject these decisions to party self-determination because the parties cannot
practically participate in the decision-making. Mediators cannot share with the
parties the decision of whether to ask a question or make a recommendation.
They must make these decisions themselves. Obviously, the moment the question
or the recommendation has been put to the parties, the parties regain their right of
self-determination and may decide how to respond. For example, they may
decide whether to answer the question, how to answer it, whether to accept the
mediator’s recommendation, etc. This decision is theirs to make and the mediator
is not allowed to coerce the parties to accept any decision.
Moreover, there are circumstances in which mediators are ethically
prevented from involving the parties in the decision-making. The mediator might
consider that the parties should be aware of certain information that is essential
for them to exercise self-determination or for the process to be fair. In principle,
the parties should first decide whether they want the mediator to provide them
with information, i.e. the mediator should ask the parties whether they wish to be
78. See id. at 170.
79. See, e.g., Macfarlane, supra note 20, at 63.
80. For example, the mediator must phrase the questions in a way that maintains impartiality.
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provided with certain information. But there may be circumstances in which the
mediator is prevented from sharing with the parties the information or even the
considerations for and against bringing the information to the parties’ knowledge.
The mediator might be under a duty of confidentiality to keep to himself
information obtained in a private session from one of the parties who objects to
revealing the information to another party, or under a duty to preserve an
impression of impartiality in circumstances where provision of information might
82
give an impression of favoritism. In such cases, the mediator must make the
decision alone, without the participation of the parties, in order to meet his other
ethical obligations. Should he advise the parties to consult a professional
83
expert? Should he ask the parties general questions, leading them to search for
84
relevant information by themselves? These type of mediator decisions—to give
a professional recommendation or ask a question—are not the type of decisions
that can practically be subject to party self-determination. Furthermore, these
decisions do not undermine party self-determination; on the contrary, they supply
the parties with relevant information and contribute to a quality decision-making
85
by the parties,
2. Balancing Decisions: Decisions Mediators Must Make in Order to
Conduct Mediation in Accordance with Governing Rules of Conduct
Notwithstanding Parties’ Objection
The first category of mediator decision-making dealt with decisions the
mediator cannot share with the parties and thus is justified in making alone. All
other decisions must be left to the parties. Still, there will be times when a
mediator puts an issue to the parties to decide but the situation triggers a duty to
intervene and override the parties. This could happen because mediators have a
duty to conduct the mediation according to the code of conduct that applies to
them. The right of the parties to make decisions cannot mean a right to compel
mediators to breach other rules of conduct. Thus, if the parties’ decision or
behavior makes it impossible to conduct the mediation in accordance with the

81. For elaboration see infra note 97.
82. See Model Standards, supra note 4, Standard II., III.
83. See, e.g., Florida Mediator Ethics Advisory Committee, Advisory Opinion 2006-006, 1 (2007),
available at http://www.mediationtrainingcenter.com/images/MEAC_Opinion_2006-006.pdf (“A mediator is
obligated to advise a party of the right to seek counsel, if the mediator believes that the party does not
understand or appreciate how an agreement may adversely affect the party’s legal rights or obligations . . . .”).
84. See, e.g., Committee on Mediator Ethical Guidance, Opinion 2009-2, 8 (2009), http://apps.
americanbar.org/dch/committee.cfm?com=DR018600 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“Where a
mediator is concerned about whether a party can make an informed decision without being made aware of
confidential caucus information . . . the mediator can use general reality testing questions to ensure that the
party has considered risks associated with not reaching a mediated settlement”).
85. See supra, Part.IV.B.1.
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governing rules of conduct, the mediator would be justified in making a decision
against the parties’ judgment.
I shall call these decisions “balancing decisions”: the mediator balances party
self-determination and makes a decision notwithstanding the parties’ objection.
The term “balancing” in the context of mediation decision-making is borrowed
86
from the Model Standards. The Self-Determination Standard in the Model
Standards instructs mediators “to balance [such] party self-determination [for
process design] with a mediator’s duty to conduct a quality process in accordance
87
with these Standards.” The Standards do not explain what is meant by
88
balancing, and other codes which have adopted this terminology have not done
89
so either. The logical interpretation of balancing must be some sort of mediator
intervention in the parties’ decision-making that undermines their selfdetermination. The use of the word “balance” in the context of decision-making
90
allocation must have several consequences.
First, the authority to make a balancing decision is moved from the parties to
the mediator. This has already been argued as an exception to the general rule
91
that decisions are ordinarily made by the parties. The argument thus is that
mediators should limit their intrusions on the parties’ right to make decisions as
much as possible and must be able to justify such intrusions.
Secondly, in making the decision the mediator must consider the parties’
wishes. This is because a decision that does not consider the wishes of the parties
cannot be properly described as a balanced decision, rather it is an outright
rejection or denial of party self-determination. This is also a key difference
between balancing decisions and the first category of decisions discussed above
(decisions the parties cannot make). Decisions belonging to the first category do
not represent a conflict between the will of the parties and the mediator, as
mediators are unable to examine the parties’ wishes prior to making the decision
but must make the decision themselves. Balancing decisions, on the other hand,
86. Model Standards, supra note 4, Standard I.A.1.
87. Id.
88. See e.g., Michael L. Moffitt, The Wrong Model, Again, 12 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 31, 32 (2006). The
Self-Determination Standard of the Model Standards refers to the need to balance party self-determination with
mediators’ duty to conduct a quality process, and it seems therefore that it points to the Quality of the Process
StandardQuality of the Process Standard as a justification for balancing. The wording of the Quality of the
Process StandardQuality of the Process Standard however does not make it easy to understand what it means to
balance party decisions on process design and in what circumstances balancing should be exercised. The
standard has many provisions of no relevance to the meaning of balancing: some do not discuss decisionmaking as to process design, see, e.g., Model Standards, supra note 4, Standard VI sections A.1, A.2, A.6, and
A.9, and others provisions do not contribute to an understanding of the meaning of balancing party selfdetermination because they do not discuss limitations which mediators may impose on parties’ right to make
decisions. See, e.g., Standard VI, § A.4, A.7 and A.8.
89. See NY-CDRC Standards of Conduct, supra note 26.
90. See infra text accompanying note 91–93.
91. See Model Standards, supra note 4, Standard I.A.. (“. . . [A] mediator may need to balance . . .”,
recognizing that mediators should intervene in the parties’ right to decide only when balancing is needed.).
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requires mediators to consider the parties’ will and then, in fulfilling their duties,
make a decision which might be against the parties’ wishes. Thus, in order to
balance, mediators must always determine the position of the parties on the issue
to be decided, otherwise it would not be an exercise of balancing, but an outright
exercise of discretion—replacing the parties’ discretion with the mediator’s.
A third element of balancing decisions is that in making the decision the
mediator has to reflect on considerations other than the parties’ wishes. This is
because balancing the parties’ self-determination requires the mediator to weigh
considerations of a different source. The primary source for these considerations
92
is the code of conduct which applies to the mediator. Other legitimate sources
may be applicable legal norms and ethical norms which are not detailed in the
93
code.
A proper balancing of party self-determination is therefore minimal and
necessary in order to conduct the mediation in accordance with mediators’ ethical
obligations under the governing code of conduct. The mediator does not dictate
to the parties how the mediation is to be conducted; he does not prevent them
from making decisions; and he respects their wishes so long as their wishes are
consistent with his ethical obligations. In addition, the mediator involves the
parties in making the balancing decision by discussing with them the
circumstances which drive him to make the decision and listens to their view
unless he is prevented from doing so by the rules of conduct (for example, due to
a duty of confidentiality or impartiality). A review of mediators’ codes of
conduct reveals three legitimate ways in which mediators can properly balance
party self-determination.
First, mediators can properly balance party decision-making by terminating
or postponing mediation, or withdrawing against the parties’ wishes where it is
impossible to conduct the mediation in accordance with the governing rules of
conduct. This does not mean that the mediator must instantly terminate the
mediation. On the contrary, the mediator should first attempt to reconcile the
conflicting rules, make the parties a part of this attempt as much as possible, and
terminate the mediation only as a last resort. For example, a common provision
in mediators’ codes of conduct requires mediators in conflicts of interest to
disclose all conflicts of interest to the parties and have their consent to proceed
94
with the mediation. These provisions reflect the parties’ right to decide whether
to allow the mediator to proceed or to replace him according to the principle of
self-determination. However, some codes provide that where a mediator’s
92. According to the Model Standards, supra note 4, Standard I.A.1, the legitimate consideration which
mediators may weigh when balancing party self-determination is their duty to conduct a quality process, but it is
unclear what is meant by considerations of quality and why should balancing be restricted to considerations of
quality alone. See supra note 88.
93. See infra notes 100–04 and accompanying text.
94. See Model Standards, supra note 4, Standard III.C,D.; California Rules of Conduct, supra note 4, R.
3.855(b), (c); Florida Rules for Mediators, supra note 4, at R. 10.340(b), (c).
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conflict of interest might undermine the integrity of the mediation, he must
refrain from conducting the mediation regardless of the parties’ wishes (i.e., he
95
must act against the parties’ decision). This is an act of proper balancing: the
parties’ right to self-determination is not absolute and the mediator must ignore
their decision on the basis of other considerations which reflect his duty toward
96
the process and the profession to protect the integrity of mediation.
Second, mediators can properly balance party decision-making by refusing a
request of the parties that the mediator perform a specific action if that action
conflicts with the applicable rules of conduct. This is so because the parties do
not have a right to demand mediators to act against their ethical duties. For
example, parties might ask the mediator to provide them with information related
97
to his area of professional expertise. Many codes of conduct permit mediators to
provide information to mediation parties but condition it on the mediator’s
competence (i.e. the mediator having the necessary training and experience to
provide the information) and ability to do so consistent with the applicable rules
98
of conduct. This means that sometimes the mediator ought to refuse the parties’
request, notwithstanding their right to self-determination, because providing the
information would be inconsistent with his ethical obligation, for example where
99
providing the information would make the mediator appear partial. Had the
mediator followed their request he would not have conducted the mediation in
accordance with the governing rules of conduct and therefore his refusal can be
100
justified.
Third, mediators can properly balance party decision-making by performing
an action (not mentioned in the first incident of balancing, which is not a

95. Compare Model Standards, supra note 4. Standard III.E, and California Rules of Conduct, supra
note 4, R. 3.855(f)(2), with Florida Rules for Mediators, supra note 4, at R. 10.340(c) (the mediator must
withdraw if a conflict of interest clearly impairs his impartiality).
96. For more on these duties, see infra note 161, 163.
97. Where the parties do not ask the mediator for information in his area of expertise he should not, in
my opinion, provide such information on his own initiative or against the parties’ wishes because the right to
decide whether to receive such information from the mediator (and not, for example, from a professional expert)
belongs to the parties and the mediator can and should check first with the parties whether they wish to receive
the information from him or from another source. But see, California Rules of Conduct, supra note 4, at R.
3.853 Advisory Committee Comment (noting that evaluation by mediators should be given with the parties’
consent).
98. See, e.g., Model Standards, supra 4, Standard VI.A.5; Florida Rules for Mediators, supra note 4, R.
10.370(a); California Rules of Conduct, supra note 4, R. 3.857(d).
99. Model Standards, supra note 4, Standard VI.A.5; Florida Rules for Mediators, supra note 4, R.
10.370(a); California Rules of Conduct, supra note 4, R. 3.857(d).
See also Joseph B. Stulberg, The Model Standards of Conduct—A Reply to Professor Moffitt, 12 DISP. RESOL.
MAG. 34, 34 (2006).
100. See Florida Mediator Ethics Advisory Committee, Advisory Opinion 2007-002, at 2 (2007),
available at http://www.mediationtrainingcenter.com/images/MEAC_Opinion_2007-002.pdf (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (an example of a justified refusal of a party’s request to submit a mediated agreement
to court “because, necessarily, [the mediator] would not have the consent of all parties” [as required by Rule
1.730(b), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure]).
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decision to terminate or postpone mediation, or withdraw from it)
notwithstanding the parties’ objection, in circumstances where the mediator is
required to perform the act by a compelling external standard or by an express
provision in the applicable rules of conduct. For example, a mediator might be
101
102
under a legal duty to disclose mediation information (such as child abuse ), or
to prevent persons who are not the parties or their lawyers from participating in
103
the mediation. These are decisions which mediators might be required to make
without the consent of the parties or against their wishes. Similarly, a mediator
might be under an ethical duty of the governing code of conduct that is not
dependent on the parties’ will to provide information to the parties. For instance,
104
a mediator must disclose to the parties conflicts of interest, and the parties’
right to self-determination cannot override that duty of disclosure.
Proper balancing should be distinguished from improper balancing, which
means dictating to the parties how to behave or how the mediation is to be
conducted, or refusing a request made by the parties even though it is not
inconsistent with the rules of conduct. Such balancing is improper because it
violates unjustifiably the parties’ right to participate in a process conducted
according to their choices and consistent with the applicable rules of conduct. It
could be argued that proper and improper balancing cannot, in fact, be
distinguished. Where a mediator terminates mediation notwithstanding the
parties’ objections, the mediator “dictates” a decision to the parties. Additionally,
where a mediator refuses to act in accordance with or frustrates party wishes by
terminating the mediation, this “prevents” them from making a decision.
This argument should be rejected because there are substantial differences
between proper and improper balancing. First, in the case of terminating the
mediation or postponing it, the intrusion on the parties’ right to selfdetermination is minimal. The mediator does not dictate to the parties how the
mediation is to be conducted or prevent them from making a decision on the way
the mediation is to be conducted, but decides not to conduct the mediation. The
mediator is under an obligation to conduct the mediation on the basis of the
105
principle of party self-determination, and the decision to terminate the
mediation is an exceptional mediator intervention, which brings the process to an
end on the rare occasion where a decision of the parties makes it impossible to
101. Model Standards, supra note 4, at Standard V.A.; Florida Rules for Mediators, supra note 4, R.
10.360(a); California Rules of Conduct, supra note 4, R. 3.854(a).
102. Kovach, supra note 57, at 275 (“Statutes . . . mandate the disclosure of certain types of information.
The most common is a duty to report child abuse.”).
103. See, e.g., Florida Mediator Ethics Advisory Committee, Advisory Opinion 2007-004 (2007),
available at http://www.mediationtrainingcenter.com/images/MEAC_Opinion_2007-004.pdf (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (An order by a judge to limit participation in mediation to the parties and their
lawyers).
104. See supra note 94.
105. See e.g., Model Standards, supra note 4, Standard I.A.; California Rules of Conduct, supra note 4,
R. 3.853); Florida Rules for Mediators, supra note 4, R. 10.310(a).
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conduct the mediation consistent with the applicable rules of conduct. Second, in
the case of a refusal to act in accordance with a request by the parties, the
mediator does not prevent the parties from acting according to their wishes, but
refrains himself from acting as they desire in circumstances where he can justify
106
his refusal. And third, in the case of performing an act that the mediator is
under a duty to perform, it is the mediator who performs the action; it is a
specific action which he is obligated to perform in order to discharge his ethical
107
duties, and he does not dictate to the parties how to act or refrain from acting
even though his decision conflicts with their wishes.
It should be noted, however, that the line between proper and improper
balancing might sometimes become blurred. For example, it would be an
exercise of improper balancing for the mediator to threaten the parties with
termination of the mediation if they do not agree with his position, because the
mediator is using his authority to terminate the mediation in a coercive manner in
order to dictate a decision to the parties or to prevent them from making a
decision that the mediator disagrees with. But consider the following scenario:
the parties make a decision that the mediator disagrees with because the decision
prevents him from conducting the mediation according to the rules of conduct.
The mediator explains to the parties that if they insist on making that decision he
will have to terminate the mediation. In response, the parties change their mind
and the mediation continues. I would argue that the mediator acted properly. He
did not dictate a decision or prevent the parties from making a decision because
(and so long as) the parties were able to exercise self-determination with regard
to the decision they made, i.e., the decision was voluntary, un-coerced, and
informed, and the mediator persuaded the parties and explained his position, as
108
opposed to coercing the parties
or taking advantage of the parties’
109
circumstances. In doing so, the mediator discharged his duty to conduct the
mediation on the basis of the principle of party self-determination in accordance
with the rules of conduct.

106. That is, following their wishes would result in the mediator breaking an ethical duty under the code
of conduct.
107. His general duty to honor the parties’ right to self-determination gives way to a concrete duty
which applies in the circumstances.
108. See, e.g., California Rules of Conduct, supra note 4, Advisory Committee Cmt. to R. 3.853 (noting
that mediators may legitimately try to persuade mediation parties not to withdraw from mediation so long as
they do not do so in a coercive manner).
109. Taking advantage of the parties’ circumstances may happen where the parties do not understand the
limits on the mediator’s role or treat the mediator as an authority figure who ought to be obeyed.
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V. ILLUSTRATING SHARED DECISION-MAKING AND PROPER BALANCING OF
PARTY DECISIONS
This Part demonstrates the application of the theory to decision-making in
mediation. The theory applies to all the decisions that are made in mediation.
However, for reasons of convenience, this Article focuses on four types of
decisions that are commonly mentioned in mediators’ codes of conduct:
decisions on process, mediator selection, participation in or withdrawal from the
process, and outcome.
A. Decisions on Process
Decisions on process encompass decisions on procedure and management of
the process, such as decisions on the timing of meetings, who talks and when,
who participates in meetings, setting an agenda, use of private sessions, and
making an evaluation. These decisions are important for mediation to achieve its
goal: promote constructive communications between the parties to enable them to
110
reach decisions on the issues in dispute. Codes of conduct tend to say little on
the procedural aspects of conducting mediation, and as a result it is not clear
whether the parties or the mediator have the authority to make specific decisions
111
on process. Clearly, mediators are to conduct the mediation. However, there is
no necessary contradiction between mediator leadership or management of
112
process and party decision-making. Mediators can and should show leadership,
encourage parties to participate in the process, and be willing to intervene when
necessary; but their main role is not to make decisions for the parties, decisions
on process included. The following discussion draws on examples of process
decisions from mediation practice.
1. Order of Speaking
Codes of conduct are silent on whether the parties or the mediator make the
decision as to which party should speak first. According to the process/content
and substantive/non-substantive approaches, the mediator is entitled to make that
decision if it is considered procedural and not substantive. At least some writers

110. See, e.g., Model Standards, supra note 4, pmbl. (“Mediation is a process in which an impartial third
party facilitates communication and negotiation and promotes voluntary decision making by the parties to the
dispute”).
111. Even the Model Standards, which authorize the mediator to balance parties’ self-determination on
process, do not include any provision relating expressly to a specific occasion in which mediators might have to
balance a decision of the parties on process design. The Model Standards Reporter’s Notes refer to process
design as “designing procedural aspects of the mediation process to suit individual needs.” Model Standards
Reporter’s Notes, supra note 20, at 9.
112. See, e.g., Boulle & Nesic, supra note 9, at 161.
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would agree that such a decision might have substantive effect on the content and
113
outcome of the mediation, thus making it a decision that the parties should
make. Others might feel that it is an insignificant, procedural decision that
mediators are authorized to make. The theory advanced in this Article avoids
these conflicting views. This Article asserts that it would be wrong for mediators
to make a decision on who speaks first without consulting the parties because the
right to decide all issues belongs to the parties. This is not a decision that parties
cannot make and there is no ethical reason to prevent them from making it.
Now, it is possible that sometimes parties might not be able to reach an
agreement on this issue. In such cases, mediators may suggest the first speaker,
but if the parties reject the suggestion the mediators have no authority to make
the decision unless the parties agree that the mediators should decide. This
procedure supports each party’s right to make decisions. But how should
mediators act when parties cannot agree on who speaks first and reject the
mediators’ suggestion on that matter? According to the theory, these
circumstances activate mediators’ duty of balancing and give them authority to
make a decision despite the parties’ objection. The parties’ lack of cooperation
makes the conduct of the process impossible, and thus the mediator is authorized
to balance the parties’ decision (i.e. each party’s decision to be the first speaker
or the parties’ wish to continue the process on their conflicting terms) with his
duty to fulfill his role and conduct a quality process. This does not mean making
the decision on who speaks first for the parties because to do so would be an
unjustified and unnecessary intervention with the parties’ right to selfdetermination. The mediator should explain to the parties that if they cannot
reach an agreement on that issue the mediation will have to be terminated, and
114
end the mediation as a last resort.
2. Rules of Behavior and Their Enforcement
Codes of conduct tend not to lay down specific rules of behavior for
115
mediation participants. How should mediators act, for example, where parties
interrupt each other? As this is a procedural matter one might think that
mediators have a free hand to deal with such behavior and decide these issues.
The theory advanced in this Article supports a different view. Mediators should
113. See, e.g., Riskin, supra note 9, at n. 123 (referring to Sara Cobb & Janet Rifkin, Neutrality as a
Discursive Practice: The Construction and Transformation of Narratives in Community Mediation, 11 STUDIES
IN LAW, POLITICS & SOCIETY 69, 71-73 (1991) (“The decision about who speaks first can have a powerful
effect on determining the dominant ‘story’ of the dispute for purposes of the mediation”).
114. Compare Florida Rules for Mediators, supra note 4, R. 10.420(b)(3), with NY-CDRC Standards of
Conduct, supra note 26, Standard VI.B, and California (CDRC) Standards of practice, supra note 75, Standard
3.
115. Some codes, however, state that the mediator should promote mutual respect among the
participants. See e.g., Model Standards, supra note 4, Standard VI.A; Florida Rules for Mediators, id. R.
10.410; A Guide for Federal Employee Mediators, supra note 20, Standard VI.A.
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not be authorized to dictate a decision to a party or to prevent a party from
making a decision because parties are capable of making these decisions at the
outset of mediation. Mediators should discuss with the parties ground rules of
116
behavior at the beginning of mediation and reach an agreement on those rules.
If one of the parties deviates from this prior understanding, the mediator may
draw his attention to the rules that he has consented to and enforce this prior
117
consent. Thus, the mediator’s intervention and the restrictions on the behavior
of parties can be justified on the basis of the parties’ consent.
Still, let us assume either that no discussion of ground rules took place or that
the parties refuse to honor the agreed upon rules. Clearly, a constructive dialogue
cannot be maintained where each party says whatever he wants to say at any
moment he chooses to say it, such as at a time that another party or the mediator
is speaking. These are the kind of implied rules that must be observed. In these
circumstances mediators may rightfully intervene and call that party to order.
They cannot order the party how to behave, but can explain that the mediation
cannot proceed in such conditions. In effect, the mediator in such occasions
balances party self-determination (on how to behave in mediation) with
mediators’ duty to conduct a process of quality and integrity according to the
applicable rules of conduct. This contention is supported by the existence of a
duty, imposed on the mediator in some codes of conduct, to promote mutual
118
respect among the parties. Mediators have no authority to force a party to
respect another party, but the mediators should encourage that behavior and
consider terminating the mediation as an act of balancing a party’s unacceptable
behavior.
Mediators’ interventions to control party use of abusive language should be
viewed similarly. Mediators should bring common rules of behavior in mediation
to the attention of parties, ensure they understand them and accept their content,
and, in the event of a breach by a party, refer him to the rules and demand
adherence. However, in the absence of prior consent for such rules, the mediator
lacks authority to dictate to the parties how to express themselves; if he considers
conducting the mediation in these circumstances that are impossible or improper
according to the applicable rules of conduct, he should reflect that to the parties
and, as a last option, terminate the process.

116. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 55, at 162 (“The mediator should be careful not to create a dynamic in
which he or she is the authority and the parties are obedient subjects. To work effectively, guidelines must be
agreed on by consensus.”). But, note that Moore’s reason for this assertion is the effectiveness of the process
rather than party right to self-determination.
117. See Moore, supra note 55, at 220.
118. See supra note 115.
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3. Separate Meetings
Many codes of conduct do not find it necessary to expressly authorize
mediators to meet parties in separate sessions or to offer any guidance of how a
119
decision to hold a separate meeting should be made. Instead, that possibility is
taken for granted and referred to in provisions that discuss mediation
120
121
confidentiality
or other aspects of mediation.
According to the
process/content and substantive/non-substantive approaches, the issue depends
on whether the decision to hold a private meeting is viewed as procedural,
making it a decision for the mediator to make, or substantive, making it a
decision for the parties. It would be difficult to generate consensus on that issue.
On the one hand, the holding of meetings is a matter of procedure; on the other
hand, these meetings affect the content of mediation and pose dangers to the
122
parties, thus, making the decision to hold them a substantive decision that
should be made by the parties. The theory advocated in this Article resolves this
ambiguity.
According to the theory, where a mediator believes a private meeting should
be held, he should say so to the parties and seek their consent because, like all
123
decisions, this decision should be made by the parties. A decision on holding
private meetings should not be viewed as a decision within the mediators’
exclusive decision-making authority because parties are capable of making that
124
decision, and there is no ethical reason that prevents them from making it.
Thus, if one party or more objects, mediators should explain the benefits of such
meeting and the reasons why it should be held, but have no authority to force a
125
private session. Nevertheless, if a mediator considers a private meeting
necessary for the continuance of the mediation, for example, in order to assess a
119. See supra note 120.
120. See, e.g., Model Standards, supra note 4, Standard V.B; California Rules of Conduct, supra note 4,
R. 3.854(c); Florida Rules for Mediators, supra note 4, R. 10.360(b); OMA Standards of Practice, supra note 4,
Standard IV cmt. 3.
121. See, e.g., MCI Standards of Practice, supra note 42, Standard I.F.2 (domestic abuse); MODEL
STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY AND DIVORCE MEDIATION Standard III.A.6 (2000), available at
http://www.afccnet.org/pdfs/modelstandards.pdf, (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (providing
information to the participants); ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR MEDIATORS Guidline 12 (2005) available at
http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/MiscDocket/05/05910700.pdf [hereinafter Texas Ethical Guidelines] (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review) (mediator serving in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity).
122. See, e.g., Gary Friedman & Jack Himmelstein, The Understanding-Based Model of Mediation in
Menkel-Meadow et al., supra note 58, at 120, 247; Moore, supra note 55, at 375-376, Boulle & Nesic, supra
note 9, at 137, 152.
123. But see NY-CDRC Standards of Conduct, supra note 26, at n. 9 (“A party may request, or a
mediator may offer to the parties as an option, the opportunity to meet individually with the mediator.”).
124. But see Virginia Standards of Ethics, supra note 75, Standard D.2.c. (“The mediator shall reach an
understanding with the participants regarding the procedures which may be used in mediation. This includes,
but is not limited to, the practice of separate meetings (caucus) between the mediator and participants . . . .”).
125. Compare Moore, supra note 55, at 372 (“if the parties do not consider a caucus necessary, the
mediator should accede to their decision”).
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party’s competency, he should explain that to the parties, and in the event that his
view is rejected, consider termination of the process. Termination of the
mediation in these circumstances should be regarded as a proper and proportional
balancing of the parties’ determination: the mediator does not dictate a private
meeting (an unacceptable usurpation of the parties’ decision-making authority)
though he frustrates their wishes to conduct the mediation without resort to
126
private meetings.
4. Presence of Persons at Mediation
Decisions on the presence of persons at mediation or their exclusion are
another example of the futility of attempting to divide decision-making authority
on the basis of process/content or substantive/non-substantive distinctions. These
decisions can be viewed as process decisions that are both procedural and
substantive. They are procedural in the sense that they determine the participants
in the process, and they are substantive in the sense that the presence or absence
of persons might affect the content of the mediation, the self-confidence of the
parties, the power relations between the parties themselves and between the
127
parties and the mediator. The approach suggested in this Article avoids these
ambiguities and provides the rationale for placing the decision in the hands of the
parties. The parties should decide who is present in the mediation because there
is nothing that makes them incapable of making that decision and there is no
ethical reason that prevents them from making that decision. The mediator, as an
expert in dispute resolution, might think that the presence of some persons can
contribute to the mediation or might even be vital, but this cannot justify the
parties’ right to self-determination because the mediator can simply share this
information with the parties and leave the decision to them. The mediator will
acquire decision-making powers on that issue if the circumstances are such that
the presence or absence of a person prevents the mediator from conducting the
mediation in accordance with his duties under the applicable rules of conduct. If
this is the case, the mediator should convey that information to the parties and be
prepared to terminate the mediation if the parties insist on their view.
Codes of conduct sometimes take a different approach. For example, the
Model Standards provide that the mediator and the parties should make these

126. For these reasons I disagree with Model Standards of Practice for Family and Divorce Mediation,
supra note 121, Standard X.D.2 (“If domestic abuse appears to be present the mediator shall consider taking
measures to insure the safety of participants and the mediator including, among others. . .holding separate
sessions with the participants even without the agreement of all participants . . . .”).
127. For example, an accompanying friend or a representative who is an expert can increase a party’s
power position. See Omer Shapira, Exploring the Concept of Power in Mediation: Mediators’ Sources of Power
and Influence Tactics, 24 OHIO STATE J. ON DISP. RESOL. 535, 564 (2009) (discussing the expert power of
mediation parties); Nolan-Haley, supra note 10, at 831-834 (discussing the implications of representation or
lack of representation in mediation on the ability of parties to engage in a meaningful decision-making).
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128

decisions together. At first glance, it seems that the provision supports party
self-determination: these decisions are not within the exclusive decision-making
authority of mediators and a decision on the presence or absence of persons must
be made with the consent of the parties. Alternatively, the provision might be
construed to mean that the parties cannot make the decision themselves, and the
mediator’s consent is required for such decision. If this interpretation is correct,
then this would be a case of improper balancing of the parties’ right to make
decisions. The mediator in effect prevents the parties from making a specific
decision on whether to allow a person to be present at the mediation or to exclude
from the mediation a person whose presence the mediator considers to be
important. Although some codes of conduct adopt a similar approach with regard
129
to mediators’ decision-making authority on these matters, according to the
theory advanced in this Article, such an approach is wrong and results in
improper balancing of the parties’ right to decide. Deciding who the participants
will be in a given mediation, like any other mediation decision, should rest with
130
the parties in accordance with their right to self-determination. Some codes and
131
commentators seem to accept this view. If a mediator believes that the
participation of a person, whom the parties wish to be present, endangers the
process, he should explain this to the parties and try to persuade them to accept
his position. If the parties continue to insist, all that is left for the mediator to do
is to explain that he must discontinue the mediation because to continue under
such circumstance would conflict with his duties under the applicable rules of
conduct.
The same analysis applies where the mediator believes that the presence of a
person is required, but the parties object to that person’s presence. The mediator
may explain why this person’s presence is important, but in the face of parties’
objection, the mediator has no authority to dictate a course of action to the parties
and cannot allow that person to participate without their consent. Again, if the
mediator believes that the mediation cannot be conducted without the
participation of that person, he may properly balance the decision of the parties
with his duty to conduct a quality process and terminate the mediation.
Sometimes the parties are divided on the decision; in such circumstances, the
mediator may not make a decision that undermines the opposing party’s right to
128. Model Standards, supra note 4, Standard VI.A.3.
129. See, e.g., Model Standards of Practice for Family and Divorce Mediation, supra note 121, Standard
III.A.7.
130. See, e.g., Virginia Standards of Ethics, supra note 75, Standard D.2.c. (“The mediator shall reach
an understanding with the participants regarding the procedures which may be used in mediation. This includes,
but is not limited to . . . the involvement of additional interested persons.”); Florida Mediator Ethics Advisory
Committee, Advisory Opinion 2006-007 at 2 (2006), available at http://www.mediationtrainingcenter.
com/images/MEAC_Opinion_2006-007_corrected_.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“It is not
permissible for a mediator to dictate, over the parties’ objections, who attends mediation”).
131. See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, Love & Schneider, supra note 58, at 220 (“The mediator guides parties
in deciding about the best mix of participants … the parties ultimately determine who participates…”).
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self-determination. For example, if one party objects to the presence of a person
in a mediation session and another party insists that this person should
participate, the mediator may not allow that person to be present at the mediation.
The result would be the continuance of the mediation in the absence of that
person (assuming that the party who has wished him to be present agrees to go on
with the mediation) or its termination by the mediator if he considers the
132
presence of this person to be vital.
Another example relates to the presence of the parties’ lawyers in the
process. The decision whether the parties’ lawyers will be present in the
133
mediation meetings should be made by the parties. A mediator should not
134
prevent parties from making a decision on that matter or impose his view.
However, what if the mediator considers the presence of lawyers necessary, for
instance, where only one party is represented or where all parties are represented
but one of them maintains a weaker position in relation to other parties? Here, as
suggested before, the mediator may not impose his opinion on the parties;
instead, he should explain the importance of having a lawyer present in the
circumstances, and where he believes the lawyer’s presence is necessary for
conducting the mediation according to the rules of conduct—for example in
order to preserve the fairness of the mediation—he should consider, as a last
resort, balancing party self-determination by terminating the mediation.
B. Mediator Selection
Is the selection of a mediator different than other decisions on process? Is it a
decision that the mediator may balance in certain circumstances? It seems
obvious that mediation parties have a right to select the mediator in their dispute,
135
and that this is an exercise of their right to self-determination. Ethically, a
136
mediator should not insist that parties select him to conduct their mediation.

132. See, e.g., Florida Mediator Ethics Advisory Committee, Advisory Opinion 2008-006, at 2 (2008)
available at http://www.mediationtrainingcenter.com/images/MEAC_Opinion_2008-006.pdf at 2 (“[I]f the
parties are not in agreement regarding a non-party’s participation, the mediator may not allow that person to
participate . . . . If a party decides not to participate in a mediation without the involvement of a non-party or a
mediator believes that the party will be unable to participate meaningfully in the process, the mediation must be
adjourned or terminated.”).
133. See, e.g., Boulle & Nesic, supra note 9, at 180; UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT S.10 (2001), available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/mediation/uma_ final_styled_draft.pdf (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review).
134. See, e.g., NY-CDRC Standards of Conduct, supra note 26, Standard VI.C; Kovach, supra note 57,
at 149. But see California Family Code § 3182(a) (giving the mediator authority to exclude counsel from the
mediation; Nolan-Haley, supra note 10, at n. 270 (referring to statutes which authorize the mediator to exclude
lawyers from the mediation).
135. Model Standards, supra note 4, Standard I.A; Florida Rules for Mediators, supra note 4,
Committee Notes to R. 10.340.
136. See, e.g., Florida Mediator Ethics Advisory Committee, Advisory Opinion 2000-005 at 4 (2000),
available at http://www.flcourts.org/gen_public/adr/bin/meac%20opinions/2000%20opinion%20005.pdf (on
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Practically, this makes sense because mediators need cooperation to fulfill their
role successfully and a mediator who is not acceptable to the parties would find it
137
difficult to win the parties’ trust and cooperation. But is it an absolute right of
the parties or are there circumstances in which the mediator would be compelled
to place limitations on the parties’ right to make that decision?
The theory advocated in this Article can clarify these issues not dealt with
adequately in the codes of conduct. For example, the Self-Determination
Standard of the Model Standards, which allows mediators to balance party
decisions on process design, does not refer to any limitation on the parties’ right
to select the mediator in their case. One could wrongly interpret it to mean that
mediators may not balance parties’ decisions on mediator selection. However, the
parties’ right of self-determination is not absolute because in certain
circumstances the selected mediator will not be able to follow the parties’
decision to select him as mediator and would have to act against the parties’ will.
In fact, the Model Standards Reporter’s Notes recognize this possibility in their
comment on the Self-Determination Standard and refer to the standards of
conflicts of interest and competency to illustrate such limitations on parties’
138
wishes.
Other codes of conduct, such as the Florida Rules for Mediators and the
California Rules of Conduct, also provide that a mediator who is in a conflict of
interest that might undermine the integrity of the mediation must end his
involvement in the mediation, notwithstanding the desire of the parties that he
139
continue to conduct the mediation. There may be other circumstances in which
mediators would be under a duty to refuse to take on a mediation case, despite
the parties’ wishes, for example, where a mediator cannot “commit the attention
140
essential to an effective mediation.” It seems, therefore, that even though
mediator selection is subject to party determination, in some circumstances
mediators would be under a duty to decline a mediation or withdraw from it
against the parties’ wishes. In this respect, mediators balance parties’ right to

file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“A mediator should not continue to mediate when a party objects to that
mediator.”). A limitation on the parties’ right to self-determination with regard to mediator selection may come
from a source other than the mediator. In court-connected mediation programs it is common that mediators must
be on an approved list of certified mediators. In these cases, the parties’ choice of mediator is restricted to
mediators who are on the list, though the parties retain their right to withdraw from mediation at any time. See,
e.g., Boulle & Nesic, supra note 9, at 109. Discussion of this intrusion into party self-determination is beyond
the scope of this Article, which focuses on the mediator’s duty to conduct the mediation on the basis of party
self-determination.
137. See Moore, supra note 55, at 93 (“The greatest factor in the acceptability of an intervenor is
probably the personal rapport he or she establishes with the disputants”).
138. See Model Standards Reporter’s Notes, supra note 20, at 9.
139. See supra note 95; see also California Rules of Conduct, supra note 4, R. 3.855f(2); Florida Rules
for Mediators, supra note 4, R. 10.620.
140. Model Standards, supra note 4, Standard VI.A.1.
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self-determination (as to who shall mediate their case) with their duty to conduct
mediation according to the applicable rules of conduct.
C. Party Participation and Withdrawal
The right of mediation parties to decide whether to participate in mediation
or withdraw from the process at any time, which is a part of self-determination
141
provisions in codes of conducts, serves as another example of decisions which
at first seem immune to mediator intervention, but after a careful look prove to be
subject to legitimate restrictions through mediator balancing. The decision to
participate in mediation has several meanings: a decision to enter the mediation
and give it a try; a decision to continue to participate in the process; and a
decision on the manner of participation in the process. The decision of whether to
enter mediation and experience it is a precondition for participation in the
142
process. It is within the exclusive authority of the parties in the sense that
mediators may not compel parties to enter mediation and participate in the
process against their will. This ethical right is sometimes limited by legal means,
as is the case with mandatory mediation, which compels parties to participate in a
mediation session; but note that it is not the mediator who undermines party self143
determination, but the legislator.
The decision to continue to participate in the mediation belongs to the parties
as well, in the sense that mediators are not authorized to coerce parties to remain
144
in the process. This does not mean that mediators are not allowed to discuss
with parties the parties’ decision to withdraw from the process and consider,
together with the parties, their motives for withdrawal and the consequences of
their decision. Mediators may do so as long as they refrain from coercing the
parties to continue the mediation and leave the final decision in the parties’
145
hands. Similarly, mediators may not compel parties to withdraw from the
process.

141. Id. Standard I; California Rules of Conduct, supra note 4, R. 3.853(2); Florida Rules for Mediators,
supra note 4, R. 10.310(b).
142. See, e.g., Nolan-Haley, supra note 10, at 819 (“Consent to participate in the mediation process …
has several dimensions. It involves a conscious, knowledgeable decision to enter into the mediation process and
to continue participating in mediation . . . .”).
143. See, e.g., Holly A. Streeter-Schaefer, A Look at Court Mandated Civil Mediation, 49 DRAKE L.
REV. 367 (2000). A moral or ethical justification of such legislation is a matter beyond the scope of this article,
which focuses on mediators’ professional ethics.
144. See California Rules of Conduct, supra note 4, R. 3.853(3); Florida Rules for Mediators, supra note
4, R. 10.310(b).
145. See, e.g., NC Standards of Conduct, supra note 42, Standard IV.B (“[A] mediator shall encourage
parties to consider both the benefits of participation and settlement and the costs of withdrawal and impasse.”);
California Rules of Conduct, supra note 4, Advisory Committee Cmt. to R. 3.853 (noting that a mediator may
encourage “[t]he parties to continue participating in the mediation when it reasonably appears to the mediator
that the possibility of reaching an uncoerced, consensual agreement has not been exhausted”).
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Decisions on the manner of participation are more complex. The manner of
participation relates to issues such as what parties are going to say in mediation
sessions (for example, what information should they reveal?), when are they
going to say it, whether the parties should share their feelings, and whether the
parties should participate directly or have their lawyers speak on their behalf.
Clearly, party participation is important for a quality process, and mediators
146
should encourage parties to actively participate in mediation. However,
147
mediators are not allowed to force parties to participate actively. Of course,
lack of authority to mandate party participation does not mean that mediators
cannot discuss with the parties their manner of participation. Thus, where parties
do not actively participate in mediation, or where their lawyers are too dominant
at the expense of the parties, mediators should bring up the issue of party
participation in order for the parties to make an informed decision regarding the
manner of their participation in the process. In addition, as discussed above, if
parties conduct themselves in ways that make effective conduct of the mediation
impossible (for example, due to party outbursts), mediators may demand that the
parties behave in accordance with process rules agreed upon by them at the
148
outset of the mediation.
Thus, mediators may not decide for parties whether to enter mediation,
whether to continue to participate in mediation, or how to participate. However,
as the theory advocated in this Article suggests, these decisions may be balanced
in certain circumstances in the sense that a mediator might decide to withdraw
from or terminate the mediation against the parties’ wishes when he cannot
conduct the mediation consistent with the applicable rules of conduct due to the
149
parties’ behavior. Many provisions in codes of conduct for mediators support
150
this view without spelling out this rationale or linking it to mediator balancing.
151
For example, some codes provide that mediators should not allow the parties to
use mediation to further criminal conduct and should terminate the process on
152
such event. What this in effect means, is that notwithstanding the parties’
146. See e.g., MODEL STANDARDS, supra 4, Standard VI.A (“A mediator shall conduct a mediation . . .
in a manner that promotes … party participation . . . .”).
147. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA RULES OF CONDUCT, supra note 4, R. 3.853 (2) (“a mediator must . . .
[r]espect the right of each participant to decide the extent of his or her participation in the mediation . . . .”). See
also California (CDRC) Standards of practice, supra note 75, Standard 1.
148. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
149. Of course, the parties may decide to continue the mediation with another mediator or through direct
negotiation without a mediator.
150. See infra note 150–153 and accompanying text.
151. Incidents of conflicts of interest which jeopardize mediation integrity and mediator incompetence
have been discussed above, supra notes 138–39 and accompanying text, to illustrate a balancing of parties’
decisions on mediator selection; they are relevant in the context of frustrating parties’ wishes to enter mediation
or to continue the mediation with a particular mediator (for a reason connected with the mediator himself) as
well.
152. See e.g., Model Standards, supra note 4, Standard VI.A.9; California Rules of Conduct, supra note
4, R. 3.857(i)(1); Florida Rules for Mediators, supra note 4, R. 10.420(b)(4). See also Model Standards of
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wishes to continue the process, the mediator should balance their right to selfdetermination with his obligation to conduct the mediation according to the
153
applicable rules of conduct.
Some codes of conduct state that mediators must take appropriate steps when
154
they become aware of domestic abuse or violence among the parties. In such
cases, if one or all of the parties wish to continue the mediation, the mediator
might have to balance the parties’ self-determination (by postponing,
withdrawing from, or terminating the mediation) with his duty to conduct the
mediation on the basis of party self-determination (when he believes that one of
the parties is incapable of exercising self-determination) or his duty to conduct a
155
quality process (when the fairness of the process is in danger). According to
some codes of conduct, where one of the parties is unable to exercise selfdetermination due to incompetence, lack of information, or coercion, mediators
156
are under a duty to terminate the mediation. I would add that the mediator must
do so even if all the parties desire the mediation to proceed. The reason is that the
decision of the party who is incompetent, or acts under coercion or on the basis
of missing information, is not an exercise of real self-determination, and
therefore if the mediator continued the mediation, he would be in breach of his
duty to conduct the process on the basis of party self-determination.

Practice for Family and Divorce Mediation, supra note 121, Standard XI.A.5.
153. The purpose of this obligation is to maintain the integrity of the mediation process and of mediators
as a professional group. See infra notes 161, 163.
154. See e.g., Model Standards, supra note 4, Standard VI.B; Florida Rules for Mediators, supra note 4,
Committee Notes to R. 10.310(d); see also MCI Standards of Practice, supra note 42, Standard F; Model
Standards of Practice for Family and Divorce Mediation, supra note 121, Standard X.D.6.
155. See Model Standards Reporter’s Notes, supra note 20, at 19 (“Mediator guidance for addressing
challenges posed by the threat of violent conduct among participants is reinforced through such other provisions
as Standards I [Self-determination] and VI (A) [Quality of the Process].”); Florida Rules for Mediators, supra
note 4, Committee Notes to R. 10.310(d) & R. 10.410.
156. See, e.g., Florida Rules for Mediators, supra note 4, R. 10.310(d) (“If, for any reason, a party is
unable to freely exercise self-determination, a mediator shall cancel or postpone a mediation”); Florida
Mediator Ethics Advisory Committee, Advisory Opinion 2006-002 at 2 (2007), available at http://www.
flcourts.org/gen_public/adr/bin/MEAC%20opinions/MEAC%20Opinion%202006-002.pdf (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (“[T]he mediator must carefully monitor the parties’ participation in the mediation to
ascertain the parties’ ability to exercise self-determination and must be prepared to terminate the mediation if
any party is unable or unwilling to participate meaningfully in the process.”); Boulle & Nesic, supra note 9, at
173 para. (d). Surprisingly, express provisions to that effect cannot be found in the Model Standards, supra note
4. However, since the Model Standards instruct the mediator to withdraw from mediation where, for example,
he is in conflict of interest which might undermine the integrity of mediation, where he cannot maintain
impartiality, where he is incompetent, and in circumstances which jeopardize the quality of the process, see
supra note 29, it should be clear that it is the mediator’s duty to terminate the mediation where any party is
unable to exercise self-determination, and the Model Standards should have expressly stated so.
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D. Mediation Outcome
A fundamental characteristic of mediation in consensus in all codes of
conduct for mediators, which distinguishes mediation from court proceedings and
arbitration, is that mediation parties have an exclusive decision-making authority
over the outcome of mediation; thus, mediators are not authorized to make
decisions on the outcome of mediation by themselves or dictate the terms of
157
mediated agreements. However, it would be wrong to see decisions on outcome
as a special category different from decisions on process, mediator selection,
participation, and withdrawal. Decisions on outcome are also subject to balancing
by the mediator in appropriate cases.
Consider mediations in which the parties reach, or are about to reach, an
illegal agreement or a grossly unfair or unconscionable agreement. The public
might hold the mediators responsible for the inappropriate behavior of the parties
that the mediators could have prevented. Such mediated agreements might
adversely affect the public perception of mediation and mediators, the public’s
158
trust in mediation, and the willingness of the public to use the process. For
example, a mediation that produces an illegal agreement jeopardizes mediation
integrity because it might be perceived as an abuse of process for unworthy
goals, undermining important social interests such as preservation of the rule of
law and encouragement of public use of mediation. An illegal mediated
agreement ignores the rule of law, and a process associated with such outcome
159
might deter ordinary, law-abiding people from using it. Codes of conduct and
some commentators correctly acknowledge that mediators owe duties not only to
160
161
the parties, but also to the public, to the profession, and to the court (where
162
mediation is court-connected).
157. See, e.g., California Rules of Conduct, supra note 4, R. 3.853(1); Florida Rules for Mediators,
supra note 4, R. 10.420(a)(2); ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR MEDIATORS Standard I.A.1 (1995), available at
http://www.godr.org/files/APPENDIX %20C,%20Chap%201,%201-19-2010.pdf [hereinafter Georgia Ethical
Standards for Mediators] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Alabama Code of Ethics for Mediators,
supra note 30, Standard 3 & 4(b).
158. On the importance of public trust in mediation see e.g., Florida Rules for Mediators, supra note 4,
R. 10.200 (“The public’s use, understanding, and satisfaction with mediation can only be achieved if mediators
embrace the highest ethical principles.”); California Rules of Conduct, supra note 4, R.3850 (“For mediation to
be effective, there must be broad public confidence in the integrity and fairness of the process.”); California
(CDRC) Standards of practice, supra note 75, pmbl. (“Every mediator bears the responsibility of conducting
mediations in a manner that instills confidence in the process, promotes trust in the integrity and competence of
mediators, and handles disputes in accordance with the highest ethical standards.”); NC Standards of Conduct,
supra note 42, Preamble (“As with other forms of dispute resolution, mediation must be built upon public
understanding and confidence.”).
159. See Boulle & Nesic, supra note 9, at 174 (noting that “[p]olicy considerations require that
mediation should not serve to conceal illegality . . . .”); Robert A. Baruch Bush, A Study of Ethical Dilemmas
and Policy Implications, 1994 J. OF DISP. RESOL. 1, 24 (1994) (“[I]f [the mediator] does nothing, he may bring
mediation into disrepute if the illegal agreements are later discovered.”).
160. On mediators’ duties to society and the public see, e.g., California Rules of Conduct, supra note 4,
R.3850; NC Standards of Conduct, supra note 42, Preamble; Texas Ethical Guidelines, supra note 121,
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These duties are sometimes presented in codes of conduct as a duty of
163
integrity, even though an express definition of integrity is often missing. The
general duty of integrity places mediators, in some cases, under a specific ethical
duty to prevent parties from reaching a mediated agreement due to its content,
notwithstanding the parties’ desire to make the agreement. In these cases,
mediators have to balance the parties’ right to determine the mediation outcome
with their duties, according to the applicable rules of conduct, to protect the
parties, the integrity of mediation and mediators, or the integrity of the court
164
when the mediation is connected with a court program. The balancing decision,
165
usually in the form of termination of the mediation, frustrates the wishes of the
Preamble. See also Boulle & Nesic, supra note 9, at 459 (“Some mediator standards require mediators to act as
trustees of public policy in respect of certain matters. For example, mediators in family cases must ensure that
the participants consider the best interests of the children . . . .”); Lawrence Susskind, Environmental Mediation
and the Accountability Problem, 6 VT. L. REV. 1, 14–18 (1981) (arguing that mediators of environmental
disputes should ensure that mediated agreements take into account the interests of third parties). On the public
role and duties of court connected mediators see, e.g., Elad Finkelstein & Shahar Lifshitz, Bargaining in the
Shadow of the Mediator: A Communitarian Theory of Post-Mediation Contracts, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 667, 682–84 (2010); Judith L Maute, Mediator Accountability: Responding to Fairness Concerns, 1990
J. DISP. RESOL. 347, 348, 358 (1990).
161. On mediators’ duties to the profession see, e.g., Florida Rules for Mediators, supra note 4, R.
10.600 (“A mediator shall preserve the quality of the profession.”); Model Standards, supra note 4, Standard
IX; OMA Standards of Practice, supra note 4, Standard X; Alabama Code of Ethics for Mediators, supra note
30, Standard 12; Colorado Code of Conduct, supra note 20, Standard IX.
162. On mediators’ duties to the court see, e.g., California Rules of Conduct, supra note 4, R.3850 & R.
3.855(f)(2); Florida Rules for Mediators, id. R. 10.500; MCI Standards of Practice, supra note 42, Standard
V.B; NC Standards of Conduct, supra note 42, Preamble; Texas Ethical Guidelines, supra note 121, pmbl.. ;
Committee on Ethics of the Georgia Commission on Dispute Resolution, Ethics Opinion 2002-1, at 2–3 (2002),
available at http://www.godr.org/files/Formal%20opinion%202002-1%203-23-04TP.pdf (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (“The parties are required to participate by the court, and the mediator serves as a
representative of the court system. Vulgar, offensive and demeaning remarks are a reflection on the referring
court, the local ADR program and the process of mediation in general.”).
163. See, e.g., Georgia Ethical Standards for Mediators, supra note 157, Standard IV.B (“A mediator is
the guardian of the integrity of the mediation process.”); California (CDRC) Standards of practice, supra note
75, pmbl. (“Every mediator bears the responsibility of conducting mediations in a manner that … promotes trust
in the integrity and competence of mediators . . . .”); California Rules of Conduct, supra note 4, R. 3.850(a).
164. See supra notes 160–62 and accompanying text.
165. See, e.g., A Guide for Federal Employee Mediators, supra note 20, Federal Guidance Notes 1 to
Standard I (guiding mediators to withdraw from the mediation if the parties insist on an illegal agreement);
Boulle & Nesic, supra note 9, at 173 (discussing the termination of mediation where “the agreement which the
parties want to conclude is illegal in some respects.”); Florida Rules for Mediators, supra note 4, R.
10.420(b)(4) (“[A mediator shall] terminate a mediation entailing . . . unconscionability . . . .”); Virginia
Standards of Ethics, supra note 75, Standard J (requiring mediators to withdraw if they “believe that manifest
injustice would result if the agreement was signed.”). See also John W. Cooley, A Classical Approach to
Mediation - Part I: Classical Rhetoric and The Art of Persuasion in Mediation, 19 DAYTON L. REV. 83, 130
(1993) (“[W]here the mediator or nonparties perceive, or could perceive, the resulting agreement to be illegal,
grossly inequitable, or based on false information . . . . the mediator must apprise the parties of the problem,
redirect their efforts toward generating new, acceptable options, and, as a last resort, withdraw as mediator and
terminate the mediation.”). Some codes leave mediators with discretion as to whether to terminate the
mediation in circumstances of grossly unfair agreements, a wrong approach in my opinion. See, e.g., Georgia
Ethical Standards for Mediators, supra note 157, Standard IV.A; Model Standards of Practice for Family and
Divorce Mediation, supra note 121, Standard XI.A.4.
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166

parties to reach a mediated agreement. The justification for limiting the parties’
right of self-determination in these cases lies in the acceptance of interests other
than the parties’ as worthy of protection, and the recognition that mediators, as
167
professionals, are under a duty to protect those interests.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has focused on the allocation of decision-making authority in
mediation between mediation parties and mediators, an issue that suffers from
ambiguity and has not received adequate attention in academic writing and in
mediators’ codes of conduct. A review of codes of conduct for mediators, which
focused on the California Rules of Conduct and the Florida Rules for Mediators,
has shown that codes generally ignore the tension between mediation parties’
right to make decisions, which is a fundamental feature of mediation, and
mediators’ duty to make decisions, which is a necessity if they are to conduct a
quality process for the benefit of the parties. The Model Standards have served as
a rare exception since they recognize the need to balance party self-determination
with a mediator’s duty to conduct a quality process. However, even the Model
Standards leave mediators and participants in a state of confusion because they
fail to explain what balancing means, in what circumstances it should take place,
and why balancing is formally restricted to decisions on process when in fact the
Standards contain many other occasions in which the mediator is authorized to
make decisions against the parties’ will.
Moreover, the review of mediators’ codes of conduct and mediation literature
has demonstrated that current approaches to decision-making in mediation, which
seek to allocate decision-making powers on the basis of distinctions between
process, content, and substance, (i.e., between decisions relating to process,
decisions relating to content and outcome, substantive decisions, and decisions
which are not substantive) are not successful in providing guidance to mediators.
Nor do these approaches offer information to users of mediation on the allocation
of decision-making authority in mediation. This Article has pointed out that it is
impossible and impracticable to draw a clear line between decisions on process
and decisions on content, or between decisions of substance and non-substance.
There is no sense in arguing that the principle of party self-determination applies
only to content as opposed to process or to substantive decisions as opposed to
decisions that are presumably not substantive. Thus, this Article has argued
mediators should respect a general right of mediation parties to make decisions
166. Though, of course, mediators have no means to prevent parties from reaching the same agreement
outside mediation.
167. The injury to interests of individuals in codes of conduct is sometimes justified by the protection of
public good. See, e.g., Kevin Gibson, Contrasting Role Morality and Professional Morality: Implications for
Practice, 20 J. OF APPL. PHIL. 17, 22 (2003) (noting that “[p]rofessional codes may occasionally override
individual interests but this may be justified on the basis of the overall good”).
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on process as well as on content, outcome, and substance. Instead of the old
unhelpful dichotomy, a theory of shared decision-making in mediation
(summarized below) has been suggested. The theory offers guidelines to
mediators and informs mediation parties on their respective parts in the decisionmaking process in mediation. It consists of three general principles:
A. Party Decision-Making. The authority to make decisions in
mediation rests with the parties by virtue of the principle of selfdetermination. The parties have a right to self-determination in
relation to any issue that has to be decided in the course of
mediation, procedural or substantive.
B. Shared Decision-Making. Mediators have authority to make those
decisions that are necessary to conduct mediation in accordance with
the applicable rules of conduct. However, due to the general
applicability of the parties’ right to self-determination, where
mediators exercise their authority to make decisions, they must
involve the parties in the decision-making process, and either have
their consent to the decision or follow the parties’ determination on
the issue.
C. Mediator Independent Decision-Making. Notwithstanding the
aforementioned, mediators have authority to make decisions without
the parties’ consent or against their wishes in the following
circumstances:
1. Where shared decision-making is practically impossible or
168
inconsistent with applicable mediators’ rules of conduct; or
2. Where the mediator is required by the applicable mediators’
rules of conduct or an overriding external standard to make one
169
of the following decisions (a duty of balancing):
(a) Terminate, postpone, or withdraw from mediation because
he cannot conduct the mediation consistent with the
applicable rules of conduct; or
(b) Refuse to perform an act requested by the parties, which
would be inconsistent with the applicable rules of conduct;
or

168. See supra Part IV.B.1.
169. See supra Part IV.B.2.
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(c) Perform a specific act that he is under a duty to perform by
an express provision in the applicable rules of conduct or by
a compelling external standard.
The theory fills a gap in the existing codes of conduct for mediators and
mediation literature. It explains the allocation of decision-making powers
between mediation parties and mediators, and it clarifies the general applicability
of the principle of party self-determination to all mediation decisions except
those that cannot be left to the parties. The theory also instructs mediators to
share decision-making with the parties and obtain their consent for decisions
made in the course of mediation, while at the same time, recognizing the
existence of independent mediator decisions which cannot be subjected to party
self-determination—thus, clarifying the meaning of mediators’ balancing
authority. Additionally, it refutes the unjustified distinction between decisions on
process and decisions on other issues. The theory clarifies that mediators’
balancing authority applies to all mediation decisions other than those that are
practically impossible or that would be inconsistent with mediators’ rules of
conduct, if shared with the parties.
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